Analysis of Y00 Protocol under Quantum Generalization of a Fast
  Correlation Attack: Toward Information-Theoretic Security by Iwakoshi, Takehisa
VOLUME XX, 2017 1 
Analysis of Y00 Protocol under Quantum 
Generalization of a Fast Correlation Attack: 
Toward Information-Theoretic Security 
Takehisa Iwakoshi 
Department of Information Engineering, Mie University, 1577 Kurimamachiya-cho, 
Tsu, Mie 514-8507, Japan  
Corresponding author: Takehisa Iwakoshi (iwakoshi@cs.info.mie-u.ac.jp). 
ABSTRACT In our previous work, it was demonstrated that the attacker could not pin-down the 
correct keys to start the Y00 protocol with a probability of one under the assistance of unlimitedly 
long known-plaintext attacks and optimal quantum measurements on the attacker’s quantum memory. 
However, there were several assumptions that the Y00 system utilized linear-feedback shift registers 
as pseudo-random-number generators, and a fast correlation attack was disabled by irregular mapping 
on the Y00 systems. This study generalizes such an attack to remove the assumptions of the previous 
work. The framework of the security analyses of this study reiterates two well-known results from 
the past: (1) Y00 systems would be cryptanalyzed when the system is not designed well; (2) the 
system is possibly information-theoretically secure when the system is designed well, although the 
attacker’s confidence in the correct key increases over time but the success probability of key 
recovery does not reach unity in finite time; (3) the breach time of the shared keys is increasingly 
threatened with time. Hence, a key-refreshment procedure for the Y00 protocol is provided herein. 
Such security analyses are important not only in key refreshment but also in initial key agreement 
situations.  
INDEX TERMS Information-Theoretic Security, Optical network, Quantum cryptography, Quantum 
detection theory, Secure communications 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the first concept of quantum key distribution (QKD) was invented [1], [2], whether information-
theoretically secure (ITS) communication is realizable using the laws of quantum physics is a topic that 
has garnered immense attention. 
Around the year 2000, the Y00 protocol (its original name was αη) was proposed by Yuen [3]–[6] for 
compatibility to existing high-speed and long-distance optical communication infrastructure [3]–[15]. 
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However, the Y00 protocol had been believed to be non-ITS since the fast correlation attack (FCA) on 
the Y00 protocol was found [16], [17], even after “irregular mapping” was equipped as a countermeasure 
to the FCA [17], [18]. Hence, the Y00 protocol is believed to be computational secure, while QKDs are 
said to be ITS. 
In our previous work [19], it was shown that the attacker “Eve” could not guess the correct secret keys 
shared by legitimate users “Alice” and “Bob” with a probability of one even under an unlimitedly long 
known-plaintext attack (KPA) with the assistance of quantum memory to utilize the quantum and 
classical multiple-hypotheses testing theory [20]–[22]. The key aspect of the unlimitedly long KPA is to 
simplify the security analysis of the Y00 protocol because the signals cyclically appear when the effect 
of the plaintext is subtracted. However, our previous work still assumed that the Y00 system was 
designed as is; therefore, no security guarantee existed as to how ITS would be realizable against 
unknown computational attacks. 
The purpose of this study is to show that well-designed Y00 systems are immune to the quantum 
generalization of FCA with the assistance of the unlimitedly long KPA and quantum memories that Eve 
possesses without any computational assumptions. The analyses in this study demonstrate two results: 
the main claim of the FCA was recovered against a certain class of Y00 systems not well-designed, while 
the others would be ITS under the unlimitedly long KPA with the generalized framework of FCA. The 
framework of the quantum generalization of FCA corresponds to “collective attacks” or “coherent 
attacks” in the context of QKDs [23], while the existing security analyses of the Y00 protocol were 
“individual attacks” in the context of QKDs [7]–[18]. 
The security analyses in this study provide clear security parameters: the security breach time of the 
Y00 systems, and the minimum error pattern probability that determines the breach time. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section II will describe the differences between the conventional 
stream ciphers and the Y00 protocol in terms of probabilities and information theory to show how the 
Y00 would be ITS along with the principle of the Y00 protocol. Section III describes the quantum 
detection theory that Eve performs on her quantum memory storing wire-tapped quantum states. Section 
IV describes the known concepts of FCA and how it will be generalized in this study. The section also 
describes the conditions for designing non-ITS Y00 systems and ITS Y00 systems, reiterating known 
results [16]–[19] in terms of the security breach time. Even if the Y00 system is implemented to be ITS, 
Eve’s success probability increases in the end; hence, Section V describes how the Y00 system securely 
exchanges fresh keys. Section VI describes the remaining problem, while Section VII states the 
conclusions. 
2. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PRINCIPLES OF Y00 PROTOCOL 
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This section describes the differences between the conventional stream ciphers and quantum-noise-
randomized stream ciphers, such as the Y00 protocol. 
A. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF CONVENTIONAL MATHEMATICAL STREAM CIPHERS 
Let Set(V) denote the set of possible variables V, let |Set(V)| denote the number of elements in Set(V). 
Conventional stream ciphers expand an initial short key k ∊ Set(K) into a longer keystream s ∊ Set(S) by 
a pseudo-random-number generator (PRNG). If the KPA is longer than the period of s, it completely 
reveals s. Alice sends her message x ∊ Set(X) encoded into her ciphertext c ∊ Set(C) by 
: mod 2= +C X S .                                                                (1) 
Then, Eve can recover k, irrespective of the complexity of the key expansion algorithm because the 
key expansion is deterministic, and Eve knows the PRNG, according to Shannon’s maxim. In terms of 
conditional probabilities, 
( ) ( )Pr | , Pr | , 1= =S C X K C X .                                                    (2) 
In terms of Shannon entropy, 
( ) ( )| , | , 0H H= =S C X K C X .                                                   (3)          
B. PRINCIPLE OF THE Y00 PROTOCOL 
To start the Y00 protocol, Alice and Bob must share secret keys, k and Δk. Then, they expand (k, Δk) ∊ 
Set(K, ΔK) into key streams (s, Δx) ∊ Set(S, ΔX) using the common PRNGs equipped in the transmitter 
and receiver. Subsequently, s is chopped to every log2 M bit to form an M-ary string s(t) at time slot t. A 
message bit x(t) is encoded into a coherent state [ ( )]m tα  as follows: 
[ ] [ ]( )( ) : Map ( ) Map ( ) ( ) ( )mod 2m t t M t x t x t= + + + ∆s s .                                 (4) 
Map[s(t)] is a projection from s(t) to Map[s(t)] ∊ {0, 1, 2, 3, …, M – 1}. For the detailed characteristics 
and concrete Map[‧], the references [11]–[13] are helpful to understand. Therefore, x(t) ∊  {0, 1} 
corresponds to a set of quantum states { [ ( )] ,m tα [ ( ) ] }m t Mα +  when Map[s(t)] + Δx(t) is an even 
number; otherwise, { [ ( ) ] ,m t Mα + [ ( )] }m tα . In contrast, Bob’s receiver sets an optimal threshold to 
discriminate the set of quantum states based on the shared (s, Δx). Therefore, he decodes x(t) because he 
knows the value of Map[s(t)] + Δx(t). Meanwhile, Eve must discriminate the 2M-ary signals hidden 
under the overlapping quantum and classical noise because she does not know whether Map[s(t)] + Δx(t) 
is even or odd and also does not know x(t). 
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When Eve can launch KPA longer than TLCM, which is the least common multiple (LCM) of PRNGs’ 
periods in a Y00 system, she will launch an optimal measurement to guess the most probable shared 
keys. Accordingly, in such a case, the quantum detection theory for multiple-hypothesis testing is 
required to evaluate the security of the Y00 protocol. Eve obtains the coherent states separated from a 
beam-splitter as ρE[m(t)] and stores the time sequence in her quantum memory. The quantum sequence 
ρE(s, Δx, x) with the splitting ratio η is denoted as follows: 
E 1( , , ) : ( , , ) ( , , )  [ ( )] [ ( )]
T
t m t m tρ ηα ηα ηα ηα=∆ = ∆ ∆ =⊗s x x s x x s x x .                       (5) 
Note that a set of (s, Δx) is generated from (k, Δk). Therefore, Eve needs to solve a |Set(K,ΔK)|-ary 
discrimination problem based on the unlimitedly long KPA like in the case of the conventional stream 
cipher, although the number of possible signal sequences is (2M)T, which is considerably larger than |Set(K, 
ΔK)|. 
C. SECURITY FRAMEWORK OF THE Y00 PROTOCOL 
Shannon proved the necessary condition of perfect secrecy in his Theorem 6 [24] as 
( ) ( )Pr | Pr=X C C .                                                                         (6) 
After Shannon’s perfect secrecy, Wyner showed that almost perfect secrecy could be maintained if the 
channel to Eve is noisy enough [25]. Such a degradation for Eve is realized only on the physical layer 
[26]. However, the property of noise on the wire-tap channel is unknown in general situations, especially 
in the case that Eve has no restrictions on her performance except the laws of physics. 
In the case of a Y00 system, the property of noise depends on the implementation of the system. Eve 
cannot avoid quantum noise in eavesdropping ideal Y00 systems because of overlapping quantum noise 
caused by the Born rule, as described in Section IV. Consider the following simplified situation. Alice 
and Bob communicate by a stream cipher 
 : mod 2= +C X S .                                                                        (7) 
In contrast, Eve receives a ciphertext CE with an error pattern E caused by the noise as 
 E : mod 2= + +C X S E .                                                                      (8) 
From (8), Eve would be able to recover S if she had known E and X and had observed CE. Hence, 
 ( )EPr | , , 1=S E C X .                                                                     (9) 
However, because Eve never knows E, 
( ) ( ) ( )E E E| , , , , , 0H H H≥ − =S C X S C X C X E .                                 (10) 
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The equality in (10) holds only when E is a deterministic function of CE and X, which never happens 
until (8) is satisfied except when Eve can estimate S by algebraic attacks such as FCA, corresponding to 
the security analysis by equations (6)–(8) in a previous study [6]. The derivation of (10) as well as the 
reason why the FCA succeeded are given in Appendix A. 
Hence, the ideal Y00 protocol never allows Eve to obtain S as well as K deterministically, which is 
significantly different from conventional stream ciphers in Section II.A. Therefore, (10) suggests that an 
ideal Y00 system is ITS. 
Accurately, von Neumann entropy is more suitable than Shannon entropy because Eve is supposed to 
store wire-tapped quantum states in her quantum memory. However, Eve must measure her memory to 
obtain the most likely results. Therefore, Shannon entropy is sufficient because the measured results are 
classical. The above point will be discussed in Section IV.E. 
D. OTHER CLASSES OF ATTACKS 
The readers may wonder why this study treats only KPA while there are several classes of attacks as 
follows. 
1. Ciphertext only attacks (COA); The attacker utilizes the only ciphertext to obtain the plaintext or the 
key. 
2. Known plaintext attacks (KPA); The attacker knows the plaintext then tries to find the encryption 
key. 
3. Chosen plaintext attacks (CPA); The attacker can access the encryption system to obtain the pair of 
a known plaintext and the corresponding ciphertext. 
4. Chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA); The attacker can access the decryption system, then injects 
ciphertext to obtain the corresponding plaintext. 
In any classes except COA, the attacker can obtain the pair of the plaintext and the corresponding 
ciphertext to perform key-recovery attacks in the Y00 systems. Therefore, there is no significant 
difference between unlimitedly long KPA in this study and other cryptologic attack classes. 
3. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF QUANTUM DETECTION THEORY 
This section describes how Eve utilizes her quantum memory and performs the optimal measurement. 
The description shows that Eve’s success probability in obtaining the correct keys never reaches unity. 
A. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE QUANTUM DETECTION THEORY 
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From this section onward, (s, Δx) ∊ Set(S, ΔX) is abbreviated as r ∊ Set(R) for simplicity. In the quantum 
detection theory, ( , )W r x  is a Hermitian risk operator, and E{ ( | )}M r x  is a set of Eve’s optimal 
measurement operators to minimize her average error rate conditioned on the known x [20], [21]. The 
necessary-and-sufficient conditions of Eve’s optimum E{ ( | )}M r x in (11) are described by (12)–(17). 
E ( | ) : ( | ) ( | )M =r x r x r x .                                                            (11) 
( )( ) ESet |M I∈ =∑ r R r x .                                                                 (12) 
( ) ( ) , ESet, : Pr( ) ( , ) Pr( ) ( , ) ( , )W δ ρ ηα ηα′′∈ ′ ′= − = −∑ r rr Rr x r r x r r x r x .                            (13) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )E ESet Set( ) : | , , |M W W M∈ ∈Γ = =∑ ∑r R r Rx r x r x r x r x .                              (14) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )E E, ( ) | | , ( )W M M W − Γ  =  − Γ  =    0r x x r x r x r x x .                                (15) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )E E| , , |M W W M′ ′ −  =  0r x r x r x r x .                                              (16) 
( ), ( ) 0W − Γ ≥r x x .                                                              (17) 
Once E{ ( | )}M r x  is determined, from the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality, Eve’s average success 
probability with known x denoted by –tr Γ(x) is maximized as follows [19]. 
[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )
22 42 2
Set Set Set
tr ( ) Pr( ) ( , ) ( | ) Pr( ) ( , ) ( | )ηα ηα
∈ ∈ ∈
    − Γ = ≤       ∑ ∑ ∑r R r R r Rx r r x r x r r x r x .     (18) 
The equality is satisfied when Eve can choose E{ ( | )}M r x so that it satisfies (19). 
( )
2
2
Set
( , ) ( | )
Pr( )
( , ) ( | )
ηα
ηα
∈
=
∑ r R
r x r x
r
r x r x
.                                                 (19) 
Hence, Eve’s average success probability (20) is satisfied if and only if (21) is satisfied. 
[ ] ( )
( )
4
Set
2
Set
( , ) ( | )
max tr ( ) 1
( , ) ( | )
ηα
ηα
∈
∈
− Γ = <
∑
∑
r R
r R
r x r x
x
r x r x
.                                     (20) 
2
( , ) ( | ) 1ηα <r x r x .                                                      (21) 
B. QUANTUM DETECTION FOR SEQUENTIAL COHERENT SIGNALS 
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To provide detailed analyses for the sequential Y00 signals, the over-completeness property of coherent 
states in (22) is required with D(All) covering the entire complex plains. In (23), D(r | x) is an integration 
domain for signals originated from (r, x), satisfying (24)–(26). 
 
( )
1
1 ( ) All
( ) ( ) ( )Tt t D t t d t Iα π α α α
−
= ∈
=⊗ ∫ .                                              (22) 
( )
( )
1
E 1 ( ) |
| : ( ) ( ) ( )Tt t DM t t d tα π α α α
−
= ∈ +
+ =⊗ ∫ r e xr e x .                                      (23) 
( )( ) ( )Set | | |D D∈    + =e E r x r e x r x .                                                (24) 
( )( ) ( )Set | AllD D∈ = r R r x .                                                      (25) 
( ) ( )| |D D ′ ′+ + ≠ + =∅r e x r e r e x .                                                (26) 
  ( ) ( )( )E ESet || : |M M∈   = +∑ e E r xr x r e x .                                              (27) 
  Here, e is an error pattern from the correct r as a result of Eve’s measurement operator E ( | )M +r e x for 
the convenience in security analyses discussed in Section IV. Set[ ( | )]E r x  is a set of error patterns e 
originated from r conditioned on x. 
4. QUANTUM GENERALIZATION OF FCA AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
Our previous study [19] showed that the Y00 protocol would be secure against an unlimitedly long KPA 
under several assumptions. This section removes the assumptions to generalize FCA to evaluate the 
security of the Y00 protocol. Thus, the disadvantage of the Y00 protocol compared with that of the QKD 
+ One-Time Pad (OTP) described in Section IV.A. of [27] would be removed. 
A. BASIC CONCEPT OF FCA AND GENERALIZATION 
The fundamental concept of the original FCA is as follows [16], [17].  
1. Unless Map[‧] is designed well, some bits in r(t) are not sufficiently hidden in quantum noise. 
2. Hence, it reveals some bits in the keystream from the linear feedback shift register (LFSR) to Eve. 
3. Eve calculates the most likely seed key from the revealed bits in the keystream; some erroneous bits 
are even corrected by applying error-correction code. 
Fig. 3 of the literature [16] showed the above situation. Then, the literature [17] formulated the attack 
scheme. However, if Map[‧] is well-designed, quantum noise hides all bits in r(t) almost equally, as 
proposed by the literature [17] and [18]. A numerical simulation is performed in the literature [18]. 
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However, note that the above countermeasure is for a specific attack against a certain Y00 
implementation. There should be more general attacks. 
To construct a more general attack, the above assumptions listed in the literature [19] must be removed 
as follows. 
1. A Y00 system employs arbitrary PRNGs to expand the shared secret keys into r. 
2. Map[‧] is not specified; however, some of the bits in r(t) may not be covered by quantum noise. 
3. Eve guesses the most likely r by a collective measurement on her quantum memory, including known 
plaintext, which is different from an individual measurement on each signal in the original FCA. 
All analyses are performed similarly to the discussions in Section II. 
B. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF GENERALIZED ATTACK 
Let us denote the duration of KPA as T = N∙TLCM and the number of error patterns e as n(e| x, r) during 
T. Then, 
| |{0,1}
( | , )n N
∈
=∑ ee e r x .                                                       (28) 
Here, |e| = TLCM log2 (2M) is the length of the error patterns e. Then, Eve’s success probability Pr( | , )r r x
is given as 
( ) [ ] [ ]{ } ( ) | |
1 ( | , )
( | , ) {0,1}
1 Pr | , ! ( | , )! Pr( | , ) n
n
N n −
∈Ω ∈
≥ =∑ ∏ e e r xe r x r|x er r x e r x e r x .                  (29) 
Here, ( | )Ω r x is a set of{ ( | , )}n e r x whereby the detected state originates from r under known x, and its 
complemental set is C( | )Ω r x  := (All)Ω  – ( | )Ω r x . The upper bound of Pr( | , )r r x  is 
( ) [ ] ( )BreachPr | , 1 1 Pr( ) exp ln 2N N≤ − − −  r r x r .                                 (30) 
Here, NBreach is defined as follows: 
LCM
| |Breach 2 {0,1}
1 : log (2 ) min Pr( | , )TN M
∈
 = −  ee e r x .                                (31) 
LCM
| |{0,1}
min Pr( | , ) (2 ) TM −
∈
≤ee e r x .                                         (32) 
The derivations for (29)–(31) are described in Appendix B. The relation between Pr( | , )r r x and
tr ( )− Γ x is given by 
( )( )Settr ( ) Pr( )Pr | ,∈− Γ =∑ r Rx r r r x .                                           (33) 
C. NON-ITS Y00 SYSTEMS 
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If 1 > NBreach → 0, then the Y00 system reaches Pr( | , )r r x 1→ immediately after the protocol begins. Such 
a condition is satisfied when 
LCM
| |{0,1}
1 2 (2 ) min Pr( | , ) 0TM
∈
> →ee e r x .                                         (34) 
Therefore, in the generalized framework of FCA in this study, the known results [16], [17] are obtained 
under the condition (34). Such Y00 systems cannot be ITS irrespective of the complexity of PRNGs’ 
algorithms, as discussed in Section II. 
As a conclusion of this section, the generalization of FCA on Y00 systems is given in terms of the 
information theory and probabilities under Eve’s optimal quantum measurement without any 
computational assumptions. It was shown that there exist some non-ITS Y00 systems if their 
implementations are invalid. 
D. REQUIREMENTS ON ITS Y00 SYSTEMS 
To implement an ITS Y00 system, the requirement is ∞ > NBreach ≥ 1. Therefore, 
LCM
| |{0,1}
1 (2 ) min Pr( | , ) 1 2TM
∈
> ≥ee e r x .                                             (35) 
If (35) is satisfied, then the right-hand side of (30) never reaches unity while ∞ > N ≥ 0, which is unlike 
the conventional stream ciphers described in Section II.A, although Eve’s success probability 
asymptotically increases as time T increases. Therefore, the generalization framework of FCA in this 
study again recovers the known result [19]. 
Moreover, the following simple case satisfies the condition. 
( )Pr | , Pr( )=r r x r .                                                   (36) 
when 
LCM
| |{0,1}
(2 ) min Pr( | , ) 1TM
∈
=ee e r x .                                       (37) 
The above result means that irrespective of how long Eve launches KPA, her guessing probability 
remains the same as her pure guessing probability because of the infinitely long NBreach, although the 
condition may not be satisfied. 
The above conclusions are an analogy of OTP with a non-IID key string. If the key string is far from 
IID, its statistical property may give Eve a hint on the plaintext corresponding to r in this work because 
of the absence of (6). 
E. EFFECT OF EVE’S LOCAL OPERATIONS 
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This section discusses whether Eve can obtain any advantage by her local quantum operations, including 
any trace-preserving completely positive (TPCP) maps in her quantum memory. Such quantum 
operations include classical operations, as well. Hence, her optical amplifications on the stolen signals 
are theoretically included.  
Without her local operations, her optimal measurement is given by (18), which is given here again. 
( ) [ ]( )
2
E ESet Set
tr ( ) Pr( ) ( , ) ( | ) Pr( ) tr ( | ) ( , )Mηα ρ
∈ ∈
− Γ = =∑ ∑r R r Rx r x r r x r r x r x .             (38) 
When she performs a TPCP operation ΛE on her system, her optimal measurement operator is denoted 
as E{ ( | )}M ′ r x ; hence, her success probability is tr ( )′− Γ x . 
( )( ) E E ESettr ( ) Pr( ) tr ( | ) ( , )M ρ∈′ ′− Γ =  Λ  ∑ r Rx r r x r x .                               (39) 
Therefore, the problem is whether tr ( )′− Γ x > tr ( )− Γ x  or not. 
Such a ΛE is rewritten by a unitary operator UEQ by adding a virtual ancilla Q to Eve’s system. 
( ) ( ) †E E Q EQ E EQQ( , ) : tr ( , ) 0 0U Uρ ρ Λ = ⊗ r x r x .                                  (40) 
Then, 
( ) EQ EQSet
tr ( ) Pr( ) tr ( | ) ( , )M ρ
∈
′ ′′ − Γ =  ∑ r Rx r r x r x .                                 (41) 
†
EQ EQ EQ EQ( | ) : ( | )M U M U′′ ′=r x r x .                                                (42) 
EQ E Q( , ) : ( , ) 0 0ρ ρ= ⊗r x r x .                                                 (43) 
If (44) is satisfied E{ ( | )}M ′′ r x is an optimal measurement satisfying (12)–(17), 
E EQ EQ E Etr ( | ) ( , ) ( | ) ( , )M Mρ ρ′′  = r x r x r x r x .                                     (44) 
Otherwise, tr ( )′− Γ x  < tr ( )− Γ x . Therefore, her local TPCP operations never give her any advantages. 
 The above conclusion sounds natural since the Holevo quantity bounds the accessible information, 
while the quantum data processing inequality described by von Neumann entropy tells degradation of 
the obtainable information by TPCP maps. 
F. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
FIGURE 1(a) shows characteristics of (31) while 1(b) shows examples of (30) with parameters in its 
caption. 
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FIGURE 1.  (a) NBreach vs. mine P(e | r, x) in (31), (b) Eve’s success probability with parameters in (30) of Pr(r) = 
|Set(R)|–1 = (2256 – 1)–2, 1/NBreach = 1 – 2–13, 1 – 2–26, 1 – 2–52 from the top curve.  
With regard to the time scale of NBreach, her success probability reaches almost unity. Because her 
success probability must be sufficiently suppressed, the legitimate users must set a security threshold 
PTh to a certain level, and then, they must estimate the actual breach time of the shared key. However, 
NBreach is very sensitive to mine Pr(e | r, x) when the users need sufficiently long NBreach. Hence, in the 
actual situation, parameters must be carefully estimated from the designs of the corresponding Y00 
systems. 
G. POSSIBLY BETTER IMPLEMENTATIONS 
To realize a condition close to the ideal situation (36), the simple implementation described in Section 
II.B. may not be sufficient. 
A possible solution is to add a classical randomization technique named deliberate signal 
randomization (DSR). Security enhancement by the technique originated was obtained from a previous 
study [3]. Then, implementation using an additional PRNG was proposed [8], [11], called the “keyed 
DSR.” The concept of DSR is a modification of (4). 
[ ] [ ]( )( ) : Map ( ) ( )mod 2 Map ( ) ( ) ( )mod 2m t t t M t x t x t= + + + + ∆s d s .                     (45) 
Here, d(t) is a random string of length |d(t)| = |s(t)|. If d(t) has a probability distribution of independent 
and identically distributed (IID), arbitral error patterns e will occur with the same probability. However, 
the keyed DSR will not satisfy the IID condition because d(t) is deterministic. It would enlarge the key-
space of Y00 systems and give a longer TLCM; however, it will never be an essential solution because the 
output of PRNG is periodic. A true-random DSR is recommended. Another possible solution is to 
scramble Map[‧] by an additional PRNG as Map(t)[‧]. 
PRNGs in Y00 systems must be chosen carefully. Recall that the Y00 systems described in this study 
consist of at least two PRNGs; one is for s to select the signal level, and the other is for Δx to scramble 
(2M)TLCM mine Pr(e | r, x)
N
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the plaintext x. It is well-known that LFSRs do not even have a statistically good property. A combination 
of several LFSRs shows correlations between them. At least statistically good PRNGs must be chosen, 
such as Mersenne Twister [28] or TinyMT [29].  
H. EFFECT OF TRUE-RANDOM DSR 
By a true-random DSR, pure states being sent from Alice become mixed states for Eve, as follows: 
| |E {0,1}
( , ) : Pr( ) ( , , ) ( , , )ρ ηα ηα
∈
=∑ ddr x d r x d r x d .                                      (46) 
If Pr(d) is uniform, Pr(d) = M –T. Thus, Eve’s success probability tr ( )′− Γ x is given by her corresponding 
optimal measurement E{ ( | )}M ′ r x as follows: 
[ ]( ) E ESettr ( ) Pr( ) tr ( | ) ( , )M ρ∈′ ′− Γ =∑ r Rx r r x r x .                                          (47) 
The above situation is similar to the situation in Section IV.E, in which Eve performs her local TPCP 
operations, resulting in her local quantum system becoming a mixed state. Hence, by a similar procedure, 
( ) EQ EQSet
tr ( ) Pr( ) tr ( | ) ( , )M ρ
∈
′ ′′ − Γ =  ∑ r Rx r r x r x .                                       (48) 
†
EQ EQ EQ EQ( | ) : ( | )M U M U′′ ′=r x r x .                                                 (49) 
EQ E Q( , ) : ( , ) 0 0ρ ρ= ⊗r x r x .                                                  (50) 
Because Section IV.E concluded that Eve’s local TPCP operations never give her any advantages by 
the same discussion, the conclusion is tr ( )′− Γ x  ≤ tr ( )− Γ x , as well. 
5. KEY-REFRESHMENT BY LEFTOVER HASHING IN QUANTUM NOISE 
Section IV.D showed that Y00 systems would be ITS if their implementations are appropriate. However, 
Eve becomes confident regarding the correct keys over time. Therefore, this section provides a method 
to refresh the shared keys between Alice and Bob before the Y00 systems are threatened. 
A. LEFTOVER HASH LEMMA 
To share a set of fresh keys, Alice or Bob sends a random string x ∊ Set(X) instead of their messages, 
where x is an error correction code containing a hash function h ∊ Set(H), and a seed key kR ∊ Set(KR) 
to generate (knew, Δknew) as follows. 
New New R( , ) ( )∆ =k k h k .                                                           (51) 
Because Eve never knows X, her attack is now limited to ciphertext only attacks (COA). 
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According to the ordinary leftover hash lemma (LHL) [30], [31] there exists a strong (τ, κ, ε)-
randomness extractor to obtain the final key of its length τ with Eve’s min-entropy ( )E| ,H∞ X R C , 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )E EE 2 E E, Set ,| , log Pr , max Pr | ,H∞ ∈= − ∑ xr c R CX R C r c x r c .                       (52) 
Note that CE is the ciphertext observed by Eve under the effect of quantum noise and DSR, which 
corresponds to X for legitimate users. 
( )E| ,H κ∞ ≥X R C .                                                      (53) 
( ) ( )( ) ( )E E E R E, Set , Pr , Pr ( ) | , 2 2
τ ε−
∈
− ≤∑ r c R C r c H K r c .                                  (54) 
( )( )1 E2exp | , ln 2Hε τ ∞=  −  X R C .                                            (55) 
B. OPTIMUM LEFTOVER HASHING 
From (53)–(55), the upper-bound of Eve’s average guessing probability on H(KR) is 
( ) ( )( ) ( )E E E R E, Set , Pr , Pr ( ) | , 2 2
τε −
∈
≤ +∑ r c R C r c H K r c .                              (56) 
The derivation of (56) is shown in Appendix C. 
As discussed previously [32], [33], there is an optimum sacrifice amount in LHL as follows. 
( )1 E3(2 2 ) 0 | ,Hτε τ τ− ∞∂ + ∂ = ⇒ = X R C .                                        (57) 
If the final key is shorter than the above amount, it is considered “over-sacrificing,” whereas if the final 
key is longer than the optimal final key, it is considered “under-sacrificing.” Hence, 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )E E
1
E R E E Th3, Set ,
Pr , Pr ( ) | , 3exp | , ln 2 3 2H Pτ−∞∈ ≤ −  = × ∑ r c R C r c H K r c X R C .       (58) 
The parameter PTh is the threshold discussed in Section IV.F.  
 In the case of the Y00 protocol, there is no classical channel to exchange h contrarily to QKDs, in 
which h is openly known to Eve. However, she would also try to guess the most likely X based on her 
most confident keys denoted by rE. Then, the following inequality is derived. 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
EE E
E
E E 2 E , E ESet
E E
| , log Pr max Pr | ,
: min | ,
H
H
∞ ∈
∞
≥ −
=
∑ r xc C
r
X R C c x r c
X R C
.                       (59) 
Then, instead of (57), the following is the optimal key length. 
( )
E
1
E E3 min | ,Hτ ∞= r X R C .                                                       (60) 
Eve’s corresponding guessing probability on H(KR) is 
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( ) ( )( ) ( )EE E
1
E R E E E E Th3Set
Pr Pr ( ) | , 3exp min | , ln 2 3 2H Pτ−∞∈  ≤ − = × ∑ rc C c H K r c X R C .      (61) 
Therefore, to obtain the valid lengths of the fresh keys for the Y00 protocol, typically |knew| + |Δknew| 
= |h(kR)| = 256 or 512 bit, min r ( )E| , 3H∞ X R C  must be requested for the final key lengths, while Eve’s 
guessing probability on H(KR) must be suppressed, as suggested previously by (61). 
6. FUTURE REMARKS 
In the key-refreshment process discussed in Section V, Eve may launch so-called “entangling probe 
attacks” to steal fresh keys as well as the initial keys discussed in Section VI.D of our previous study 
[27] by preparing her quantum system and then performing joint unitary operations on her system with 
the signal states between Alice and Bob. Further generalization may be possible that Eve would keep 
eavesdropping by entangling probe attack during the key-refreshment/initial-key-agreement as well as 
KPA during the message exchanges after the key-refreshment, which corresponds to coherent attack in 
QKDs. 
The effect of such an attack on the Y00 protocol may be limited; however, evaluation of the strength 
of such classes of attacks is required. At least, in the key refreshment process, quantum minimax problem 
in [13], [34], [35] may be helpful; Alice and Bob exchange the keys with a prior probability to minimize 
Eve’s success probability, while Eve derives her optimal measurement operators to maximize her success 
probability. 
In contrast, in the message transmission processes, Eve would not require such a class of attacks 
because the plaintext is already available to her, while the purpose of the entangling probe attack is to 
steal the exchanged information in the context of QKDs. 
Rather, the critical problem in this study is that the analyses would not give any concrete designs of 
the Y00 systems because all analyses have done abstractly to find what is the necessary condition to 
implement ITS Y00 systems. Hence it would neither guarantee whether existing Y00 systems are ITS. 
However, the study showed the possibility and important parameter for ITS Y00 systems. Some more 
studies would be required to evaluate the security of the designed systems more easily compared to the 
security parameter given in this study, which is hard to estimate. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This study showed the important security parameter to request the Y00 systems to be ITS and what 
parameter determines whether the designed Y00 systems are non-ITS or ITS against an attacker who has 
unlimited computational power with the assistance of quantum memory and unlimitedly long known-
plaintext attacks. The analyzed condition is called “collective attacks” or “coherent attacks” in the 
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context of QKD protocols. The conclusions are that Y00 systems remain ITS under certain conditions 
explicitly provided in this study. Furthermore, this study showed that the attacker’s confidence in the 
shared correct key set increases as time passes. Therefore, a method to refresh the sets of shared keys is 
proposed using LHL. It had been believed that Y00 protocols are computationally secure. However, this 
study showed ITS Y00 systems are possible by pointing out what parameters are important to design 
ITS Y00 systems. To find the above requirement, security analyses were done abstractly. Hence, the 
critical problem in this study is that the analyses would not give any concrete designs of ITS Y00 systems. 
Hence, it would not guarantee whether existing Y00 systems are ITS. However, the study showed the 
possibility and the destination to design ITS Y00 systems. Some more studies would be required to 
evaluate the security of the designed systems more easily compared to the security parameter given in 
this study, which is hard to estimate. 
APPENDIX 
A. DERIVATION OF (10) 
From the equality between conditional and joint entropies, 
( ) ( ) ( )E E E| , , , ,H H H= −S C X S C X C X .                                        (62) 
An inequality between a conditional entropy and entropy with additional information gives 
( ) ( )E E, , ,H H≤C X C X E .                                                  (63) 
The equality is satisfied only when E is a deterministic function of CE and X irrespective of what S is. 
Such a situation occur when a sufficient number of bits in S are not hidden under quantum noise enough; 
then Eve can correct errors by simulation of the system and estimate the error patterns to correct errors 
using error-correcting code with LFSR, leading to successful FCAs [16], [17]. 
Eve would obtain S if she could know E. Hence, 
( ) ( ) ( )E E E, , , , , | , , 0H H H− = =S C X E C X E S C X E .                               (64) 
Therefore, (10) is derived from (62)–(64). 
B. DERIVATION OF (29)–(31) 
Consider the following summation with Ω(All) as a set of all patterns of { ( | , )}n e r x  with the total being 
N. Denote a set of possible signal sequences originating from the shared key stream r as ( | )Ω r x , and its 
complemental set C( | )Ω r x := (All)Ω  – ( | )Ω r x . 
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The last equation is derived from 
( )( )( ) ( ) [ ] [ ]| |1 21
| |31 2
| | 1
1
...... ! !kk
N nN n nN N n
nnn n N n
−
=
− −− −− = ∏e
e
e
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Furthermore, note that 
[ ] [ ]{ } ( )
[ ] [ ]{ } ( ) ( )
| |
| |
1 ( | , )
( | , ) All {0,1}
1 ( | , )
( | , ) {0,1}
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N n
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−
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∑ ∏
∑ ∏
e
e
e r x
e r x e
e r x
e r x r|x e
e r x e r x
e r x e r x r r x .                 (67)
 
Hence, Pr(r | x, r) is strictly less than unity unless | ( | )Ω r x | = | (All)Ω |. Then, using C( | )Ω r x , 
( ) [ ] [ ]{ } ( )C | |
1 ( | , )
( | , ) {0,1}
1 Pr | , ! ( | , )! Pr( | , ) n
n
N n −
∈Ω ∈
− =∑ ∏ e e r xe r x r|x er r x e r x e r x .                 (68) 
Now, using the following inequality, 
[ ] [ ]{ } ( )
{ } ( ) [ ] [ ]{ } ( )
C | |
CC | | | |
1 ( | , )
( | , ) {0,1}
1( | , )
( | , ){0,1} {0,1}( | , )
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min Pr( | , ) ! ( | , )!
n
n
n
nn
N n
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−
∈Ω∈ ∈∈Ω
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e e
e r x
e r x r|x e
e r x
e r x r|xe ee r x r|x
e r x e r x
e r x e r x .           (69)
 
In contrast, the size of | ( | )Ω r x | must be Pr(r)(2M)T because there are (2M)T  patterns of possible 
detected signal patterns, which suggest | (All)Ω | = (2M)T. Hence, 
( ) [ ] [ ]{ } ( ) [ ]C | |
1C
( | , ) {0,1}
: ! ( | , )! 1 Pr( ) (2 )T
n
N n M−
∈Ω ∈
Ω = = −∑ ∏ ee r x r|x er | x e r x r .                  (70) 
Therefore, (29)–(31) are derived by letting ( | , )n e r x  = N for the mine Pr( | , )e r x  as follows. 
{ } ( )( ) [ ] [ ]{ } ( )( )
[ ] ( )
CC | | | |
LCM
| |
1( | , )
( | , ){0,1} {0,1}( | , )
{0,1}
min Pr( | , ) ! ( | , )!
1 Pr( ) min 2 Pr( | , )
n
nn
NT
N n
M
−
∈Ω∈ ∈∈Ω
∈
 = −  
∑∏ ∏e e
e
e r x
e r x r|xe ee r x r|x
e
e r x e r x
r e r x
.          (71) 
C. DERIVATION OF (56) 
From LHL (53)–(55), the following decomposition is derived. 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
E E
R E R E
E R E, Set ,
E R E E R EPr ( )| , 2 Pr ( )| , 2
2 Pr , Pr ( ) | , 2
Pr , Pr ( ) | , 2 Pr , 2 Pr ( ) | ,τ τ
τ
τ τ
ε
− −
−
∈
− −
≥ ≤
≥ −
   = − + −   
∑
∑ ∑
r c R C
H K r c H K r c
r x H K r c
r x H K r c r c H K r c . 
(72) 
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The first term on the last side of (72) shows, 
( ) ( )( )R E E R EPr ( )| , 22 Pr , Pr ( ) | , 2τ
τε − −≥  ≥ − ∑ H K r c r c H K r c .                      (73) 
The second term in the last side of (72) shows 
( ) ( )( )R E E R EPr ( )| , 2 Pr , 2 Pr ( ) | , 0τ
τ
−
−
≤
 − ≥ ∑ H K r c r c H K r c .                                (74) 
Combining (73) and (74),  (56) can be derived. 
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